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How Far Does Charles 
Taylor Take Us in 
Developing a Christian 
Understanding of the 
Secular Age?
by James W. Skillen
Charles Taylor’s A Secular Age1 is a remarkable 
book that has received much praise and many re-
views since its publication eight years ago. Many 
Christian scholars have been among its sympa-
thetic and even enthusiastic readers. James K.A. 
Smith thinks A Secular Age is so important that 
he wrote a book just to guide readers through it.2 
The greatest strength of Taylor’s book, in my es-
timation, is its descriptions and categorizations of 
a wide range of developments in the West during 
roughly the last five centuries. I have some ques-
tions, however, about the author’s approach to 
the subject and about what we are left with in the 
end. In what follows I engage Taylor critically on 
two fronts: first, the way he develops his primary 
concern with the “conditions for belief” as those 
conditions relate to transcendence, and second, 
what he misses in his account of American civil 
religion.
Conditions of Belief
Taylor makes clear at the outset that his focus will 
be on the “conditions of belief ” in a secular age, 
not on the separation of church and state or the 
purported decline of religious belief and practice 
(2). His aim, he writes, is to try “to define and 
trace” the change that has taken us “from a society 
in which it was virtually impossible not to believe 
in God, to one in which faith, even for the staunch-
est believer, is one human possibility among oth-
ers” (3). It is clear from this statement of intent as 
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well as from all that follows in the book that he 
does not focus on the content and truth claims of 
particular faiths, including Christianity. 
Taylor contends that our age is no longer reli-
gious in a pre-modern sense and that religious be-
lief is now a matter of choice. He explores a variety 
of such choices in order to assess the conditions for 
them. At the outset he says he will speak of religion 
and religious belief as referring to transcendence 
and will speak of the secular, in the modern sense, 
as referring to immanent reality. A secular age, 
therefore, “is one in which the eclipse of all goals 
beyond human flourishing [within immanent real-
ity] becomes conceivable…. This is the crucial link 
between secularity and a self-sufficing humanism,” 
which he also calls “exclusive humanism” (19-20). 
In this age, those who reject a transcendent deity 
live by unbelief, he says, in contrast to those who 
live by belief in God. 
Taylor writes, “I want to talk about belief 
and unbelief, not as rival theories…. Rather what 
I want to do is focus attention on the different 
kinds of lived experience involved in understand-
ing your life in one way or the other, on what it’s 
like to live as a believer or an unbeliever. As a first 
rough indication of the direction I’m groping in, 
we could say that these are alternative ways of liv-
ing our moral/spiritual life, in the broadest sense” 
(4-5). Taylor believes that in some broad sense ev-
eryone’s life takes “a certain moral/spiritual shape.” 
The unstated implication here is that there is more 
to life than its moral/spiritual shape, the other di-
mensions presumably being what most Westerners 
refer to as their daily work and experiences (their 
“secular” life?) and which Taylor elsewhere refers 
to as “ordinary human flourishing” (510). 
Enlarging his description of the moral/spiritual 
shape of life, Taylor says, “Somewhere, in some ac-
tivity, or condition, lies a fullness, a richness; that 
is, in that place (activity, or condition), life is fuller, 
richer, deeper, more worth while, more admirable, 
more what it should be” (5). Those experiences in 
certain places, activities, or conditions “help us 
to situate a place of fullness, to which we orient 
ourselves morally or spiritually. They can orient us 
because they offer some sense of what they are of: 
the presence of God, or the voice of nature, or the 
force which flows through everything, or the align-
ment in us of desire and the drive to form” (6). 
In a way, Taylor says, “this whole book is an 
attempt to study the fate in the modern West of 
religious faith in a strong sense. This strong sense 
I define, to repeat, by a double criterion: the be-
lief in transcendent reality, on one hand, and the 
connected aspiration to a transformation which 
goes beyond ordinary human flourishing on the 
other” (510). Near the end of his book he says, “I 
have told a long story because I believe that one 
can only get a handle on this if one comes at it 
historically…[for] one’s story only makes sense in 
the light of a certain understanding of the place of 
the spiritual in our lives” (768). As we look to the 
future of our different stories, he says, there is one 
view, “which flows out of mainline secularization 
theory” that “sees religion shrinking further and 
further”:
I see another future, based on another supposition. 
This is the opposite of the mainstream view. In our 
religious lives we are responding to a transcen-
dent reality. We all have some sense of this, which 
emerges in our identifying and recognizing some 
mode of what I have called fullness, and seeking 
to attain it. Modes of fullness recognized by ex-
clusive humanisms, and others that remain within 
the immanent frame, are therefore responding to 
transcendent reality, but misrecognizing it (768).
By the end of his book, in other words, Taylor 
offers a more subtle and qualified understanding 
of the difference between belief and unbelief. The 
moral/spiritual shape of the believer’s life is a con-
sciously intended response to transcendence and 
is thus religious. But the moral/spiritual shape of 
the unbeliever’s life, though not emerging from a 
religious response to transcendence, does in fact 
respond to it but “misrecognizes” it in the quest to 
experience some kind of fullness. Belief and unbe-
lief are both responses to transcendence, but belief 
recognizes it, and unbelief misrecognizes it.
If we pay close attention to Taylor’s word us-
age, we can hear the shifts in meaning, the equiv-
ocations that try to bridge between old and new 
cultural contexts and between diverse modes of 
reasoning and believing. For example, on the one 
hand, he believes that all humans do respond to 
“a transcendent reality,” which is what religious 
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belief is all about, at least in the traditional sense 
of those terms. On the other hand, those who do 
not believe in anything transcendent (“exclusive 
humanists” and those who “remain within the im-
manent frame”) are acting spiritually (religiously?) 
insofar as they are seeking to attain a “fullness” or 
“richness” of life. An experience or sense of fullness 
may be brought on by an entirely immanent ex-
perience, perhaps hearing the voice of nature, but 
from Taylor’s point of view it has a religiously par-
allel or equivalent character even if the person hav-
ing the experience misrecognizes the meaning of 
it. What is the relation, then, we may ask, between 
the structure of reality, which apparently includes 
immanence as well as transcendence, and the dif-
ferent human responses to that reality? Who is 
qualified, and on what basis, to judge between the 
recognition and misrecognition of transcendence? 
At the start, Taylor says he wanted to get at 
the difference between a life of belief and a life of 
unbelief, but in passages like the ones just quoted 
he compares an experience of the presence of God 
with an experience of hearing the voice of nature 
or feeling “the alignment in us of desire and the 
drive to form.” Should we take it that all of these 
experiences are equivalent in some way and that 
all are equally legitimate? Does the difference be-
tween belief and unbelief not matter? Or does the 
misrecognition of transcendence by unbelievers—
or at least some unbelievers—present a problem 
that ought to be overcome?
Recognition and Misrecognition of 
Transcendence
Taylor says he wants to “focus attention on the 
different kinds of lived experience” rather than 
on theories about experience (4-5). Yet he doesn’t 
really focus on lived experience in the full-orbed 
sense of that term but only on “alternative ways 
of living our moral/spiritual life.” However, is it 
not precisely the relation of the spiritual to the 
ordinary (the religious to the secular) that is the 
central question in debate today about the charac-
ter of life in the modern world? Can he get away 
with setting aside the non-spiritual dimensions of 
lived experience and still present an adequate ac-
count of the secular age? Taylor takes for granted 
the duality of spiritual/ordinary, religious/secular, 
without offering a justification for his stance. Then 
he works to avoid the problem presented by deni-
als of transcendence by simply affirming that those 
denials are the consequence of a misrecognition of 
transcendence.
By speaking of “misrecognizing” transcen-
dence, however, Taylor has shifted to another level 
of characterization and categorization. The duality 
of “recognize/misrecognize” is quite different from 
the dualities of religious/secular and belief/unbe-
lief. First of all, it conveys a normative judgment 
about what constitutes a person’s recognition or 
misrecognition of transcendence. In ordinary lan-
guage that contrast conveys a judgment that the 
former is correct and the latter is a mistake. But 
that’s not a consideration Taylor chooses to con-
front. Yet the normative judgment that a person 
has recognized or misrecognized the transcendent 
would seem to call into question the axioms and 
assumptions that undergird secularist thinking of 
the exclusive humanist variety, because that frame-
work is built on the belief that there is no transcen-
dence. From the standpoint of those who believe 
there is nothing transcendent, couldn’t it be said 
that Taylor misrecognizes the truth about reality 
by projecting an indefensible belief in transcen-
dence? Taylor’s normative judgment about rec-
ognition and misrecognition, consequently, calls 
for a self-critical account of his own most basic 
suppositions and assumptions about the nature of 
reality. He believes there is, in fact, no completely 
self-enclosed, self-sufficient immanent reality, as 
exclusive humanists believe, and therefore to hold 
such a belief would appear to be more than a mere 
visual, mental, or moral mistake but rather an er-
rant belief, something fundamentally problematic.
Taylor’s belief (that such a belief is errant) 
leads directly to another very important question, 
Taylor contends that our 
age is no longer religious 
in a pre-modern sense and 
that religious belief is now a 
matter of choice.
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namely, what is entailed in the recognition of tran-
scendence? Is it sufficient, in Taylor’s mind, for 
a person to profess that there is something tran-
scendent? Or is the identity of true transcendence 
important? He states at several points that he is 
a Christian. How much of his Christian under-
standing of reality, then, should he divulge in or-
der to account for the grounds of his judgment 
about the recognition and misrecognition of tran-
scendence? Based on traditional Christian teach-
ing and presuppositions, might we not expect him 
to believe that a good and healthy life, including 
a healthy moral/spiritual life, depends on orient-
ing oneself to the love of the true God and the 
concomitant love of neighbors, as the Bible urges 
again and again? It would not be surprising, one 
would assume, for Taylor himself to believe that 
there are some quests for fullness or richness that 
are seriously misdirected, perhaps destructive, or 
even evil. 
As far as I can see, these are not questions Taylor 
wants to engage. One consequence is that some 
of his most basic suppositions and beliefs about 
the nature of reality remain undisclosed. What he 
does divulge is that he has chosen Christian faith 
for himself as others have chosen to follow other 
paths of belief or unbelief. Does this choice imply 
that each person’s choice of faith is so personal, so 
confined to the shaping of his or her moral/spiritu-
al experience, that each choice and experience has 
little to do with making judgments about the nor-
mative ordering of society? If that is true, then to 
what extent does A Secular Age help in providing a 
critical Christian assessment of our secular age, of 
the full range of lived experience in our day? 
Discerning Idolatry?
Taylor makes an even sharper judgment (than 
the one about recognition/misrecognition) when 
he criticizes those who think “they have got God 
right” or who think they are pure and right. Such 
judgments are clearly idolatrous, he says, and 
“idolatry breeds violence” (769). Here he sounds 
very much like those modernists who are con-
vinced that strong religious claims spell danger 
and lead to violence. Yet Taylor also sounds very 
postmodern in his objection to anyone who makes 
a claim to certainty about universal truth. How 
then can he be sure he is right in criticizing those 
who claim to have gotten God right? What moral 
norms ground that judgment and what is the root 
of those norms? To speak of idolatry in the strong 
sense sounds pre-modern, not modern or post-
modern. But Taylor is clearly not using the word 
“idol” to mean what it means in the Bible or in tra-
ditional Christianity. “Idolatry” is a charge he lev-
els at those who exhibit an immodest attitude when 
they draw an “unambiguous boundary between 
the pure [themselves] and the impure” (769). He 
is not joining a debate about the true God and 
false gods. Rather, he is asserting an unqualified 
judgment about the boundary between modest 
from immodest attitudes and social behaviors: it is 
pretentious and self-righteous (from Taylor’s point 
of view) for anyone to make the claim that they 
can draw an “unambiguous boundary” or get God 
right. He is sure he is right about that.
Moshe Halbertal and Avishai Margalit shine 
some light, indirectly, on Taylor’s position here 
in their book Idolatry.3 The authors point to three 
kinds of modern discourse on idolatry that re-
place, extend, or invert the biblical meaning of 
idolatry. With regard to “replacement” and “exten-
sion” modes of discourse they say, “The comple-
mentary concept to idolatry is no longer a proper 
God but something else. Thus the category of idol-
atry is maintained, while what is in opposition to 
it changes. A second, more radical modern use of 
the language of idolatry occurs when the category 
of idolatry is extended to include any competing 
opposite, even what was supposedly conceived as 
the right God himself ” (241). 
Taylor gives no account of how he came to his 
exclusivist judgment about idolatrous belief, and 
throughout the book he mostly avoids expressing 
such definite, unqualified opinions. More typical 
of his manner and style is to object to some posi-
tion by merely suggesting an alternative, as when 
he makes the case for his minority view of the 
secularization process. He is not convinced by the 
argument of secularization theorists that the de-
cline of religious belief will continue until religions 
whither away. He suggests another possible future 
of the secular age, one in which choices of shaping 
moral/spiritual life will continue to exhibit reli-
gious liveliness as long as people continue to aspire 
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to “a transformation which goes beyond ordinary 
human flourishing”: 
Thus, my own view of “secularization”, which I 
freely confess has been shaped by my own perspec-
tive as a believer (but that I would nevertheless 
hope to be able to defend with arguments), is that 
there has certainly been a “decline” of religion. Re-
ligious belief now exists in a field of choices which 
include various forms of demurral and rejection; 
Christian faith exists in a field where there is also 
a wide range of other spiritual options. But the in-
teresting story is not simply one of decline, but 
also of a new placement of the sacred or spiritual 
in relation to individual and social life. This new 
placement is now the occasion for recompositions 
of spiritual life in new forms, and for new ways of 
existing both in and out of relation to God (437).
Even if Christian faith has lost the public status 
and influence it had when it was the all-encom-
passing cultural glue of medieval Christendom, 
Taylor believes that Christian faith is still a possi-
bility today for those who choose it. Yet the secular 
age appears, in this affirmation, just to be there, 
serving as a religiously neutral, society-wide plat-
form on which many different faiths, demurrals, 
and rejections can be chosen and celebrated in per-
sonal ways with or without God. 
But what is the origin, character, and moti-
vational dynamic of the secular age as an age, as 
an identifiable era? Taylor, it appears to me, un-
derestimates the institutional and social shaping 
power of modern secularist beliefs that have done 
so much to shape and organize all areas of public 
and not only personal life. The secular age did not 
appear out of thin air as a new social environment 
in which people are free to operate. The shaping 
of life in the West from the time of the crisis of 
medieval Christendom has been one of conflict, 
often with violent struggles over the most basic 
beliefs about how to organize and govern society 
and about the very meaning of human society. 
Among the visions and drives competing to shape 
the “new world,” the most influential across wide 
swaths of public as well as private life has been 
modern secularism—exclusive humanism, or self-
sufficing humanism—expressed through a wide 
range of philosophies and ideologies to be sure, 
but also through organized political, economic, 
and popular cultural movements. The wide range 
of socially gripping ideologies has included mate-
rialism and freedom-idealism, individualism, and 
collectivism. To be sure, the secularizing efforts 
of all of these have not yet succeeded altogether. 
Large numbers of people even in the West contin-
ue to believe in one or another transcendent reality 
in the personal-choice way that Taylor describes. 
But many believing Christians and people of other 
faiths do not treat their religious commitments as 
merely a choice they make. They are not willing to 
accommodate to the public secularizing onslaught 
without a fight. So political, economic, and educa-
tional struggles continue within many societies on 
many fronts across much of the world. 
It seems to me, therefore, that it is a mistake 
to categorize exclusive humanism as either a non-
religious point of view or one among many pos-
sible personal beliefs in the open field of our secu-
lar age. While most of today’s Western societies 
are more pluralistic with regard to both personal 
belief and freedom, for synagogues, mosques, and 
churches to operate, the dominant belief that has 
been shaping the life of nations, economies, edu-
cation, and more is neither private nor neutral. Its 
aim, we might say, has been to establish one or 
another kind of “seculardom” to fill the vacuum 
of disintegrated Christendom. Taylor continues 
to speak of religion in the narrow sense of that 
term—as the shaping of moral/spiritual experience 
that individuals and private communities choose 
for themselves. He gives far too little attention to 
how various belief systems, including self-sufficing 
Taylor, it appears to 
me, underestimates the 
institutional and social 
shaping power of modern 
secularist beliefs that have 
done so much to shape and 
organize all areas of public 
and not only personal life.
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humanism, contend with one another as spiritual-
moral-cultural driving forces competing to shape 
entire societies. 
American Civil Religion
In the light of my criticism of Taylor’s lack of at-
tention to the full range of lived experience, an-
other valuable point of entry to his discussion of 
the secular age is his description of American civil 
religion that is found in the fourth major section 
of his book, in which he considers “the age of 
mobilization.” This is the age, he writes, in which 
“whatever political, social, ecclesial structures we 
aspire to have to be mobilized into existence” 
(445). Beginning in the eighteenth and nine-
teenth centuries, he argues, Westerners no longer 
accepted assigned stations under a naively assumed 
sacred canopy as they did in ancient regimes. They 
found themselves “persuaded, pushed, dragooned, 
or bullied into new forms of society, church, as-
sociation” (445). They not only adopted new 
structures but also changed their view of the world 
and the moral order. The age of mobilization still 
finds room for God, but unlike the “ancien regime 
model,” the newer order is no longer hierarchical. 
Human authority is no longer bound up directly 
with God’s authorization through some sacred 
unction or representative figure or institution. If 
the old order might be called “enchanted” (Max 
Weber’s term), then the new order moves toward 
“disenchantment,” often expressed religiously in 
deism. Taylor explains:
Now with advancing disenchantment, especially 
in Protestant societies, another model took shape, 
with relation both to the cosmos and the polity. 
In this the notion of Design was crucial. To take 
the cosmos, there was a shift from the enchanted 
world to a cosmos conceived in conformity with 
post-Newtonian science, in which there is abso-
lutely no question of higher meanings being ex-
pressed in the universe around us. But there is still, 
with someone like Newton himself, for instance, 
a strong sense that the universe declares the glory 
of God. This is evident in its Design, its beauty, 
its regularity, but also in its having evidently been 
shaped to conduce to the welfare of His creatures, 
particularly of ourselves, the superior creatures 
who cap it all off. Now the presence of God no 
longer lies in the sacred, because this category 
fades in a disenchanted world. But He can be 
thought to be no less powerfully present through 
His Design (446-47).
This new idea of divine presence through design 
in the cosmos also significantly influenced the idea 
of divine presence via design in the political order, 
argues Taylor. Divine design is found in the moral 
law, a natural law, that holds for human responsi-
bility, as expressed, for example, in the American 
Declaration of Independence: “Men have been 
created equal, and have been endowed by their 
creator with certain inalienable rights” (447). 
Taylor goes on to say, “The idea of moral order 
which is expressed in this Declaration, and which 
has since become dominant in our world, is what 
I have been calling the Modern Moral Order…. 
Its members are not agents who are essentially 
embedded in a society which in turn reflects and 
connects with the cosmos, but rather disembedded 
individuals who come to associate together. The 
design underlying the association is that each, in 
pursuing his or her own purposes in life, acts to 
benefit others mutually” (447).
This argument overlaps with Eric Nelson’s in 
The Hebrew Republic.4 Nelson traces in detail the 
work of some influential European thinkers in the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries who sought to 
find in ancient Israel’s “constitution” a model for a 
modern republic. They were looking for a norma-
tive design that could endure over time and serve 
any rational people as the model for their political 
order. In locating the right design, they obtained 
all they needed, politically speaking, from the 
Bible. The work of those thinkers had great influ-
ence in the founding era of the American repub-
lic. The people no longer needed a transcendent, 
personal authority to be active in human affairs. 
Sacred history could be separated from secular his-
tory. The biblical story in its particularity was no 
longer needed as the context for the mobilizing 
efforts Taylor describes. Those who were not yet 
ready to dispense with God altogether could ap-
peal to an original designer of the cosmos (deism) 
with its natural and moral laws, including laws for 
the human moral order. 
Taylor’s assessment of America’s civil religion, 
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it seems to me, depends too much on this design 
argument and too little on what lies more deeply 
beneath it, namely, the new-Israel myth, which 
I believe was the more potent force molding the 
self-understanding of the people as a nation. 
The national new-Israel myth, with its roots in 
Puritanism, often functioned in tension with, or 
in contrast to, early American ideas of government 
(448). The secular-religious contrast Taylor draws 
is between the political system (connected indi-
rectly to God through design) and “free churches,” 
in which members experienced and expressed their 
personal relation to the God whose salvation opens 
the way to eternal life. The latter is what Taylor 
calls religious, and the former is the secular. That 
distinction reflects the now-standard sacred-secu-
lar view of America’s identity as a secular republic, 
which supports the private religious freedom of 
churches and individuals. The churches function 
to “sustain the Godly ethos which the [secular] 
Republic requires” (453).
However, this description hides from view 
the civil-religious dynamics of the nation, which 
precedes the design of the Constitution and its 
First-Amendment protection of religious freedom 
for individuals and churches. The motivating vi-
sion that drew Americans together into revolution 
against England was the vision of themselves as a 
new, divinely chosen nation. In my reading of A 
Secular Age, the closest Taylor comes to acknowl-
edging this vision is in his discussion of religious 
denominationalism in the United States: 
Just because one’s own church does not include 
all the faithful, there is a sense of belonging to a 
wider, less structured whole which does. And this 
can find at least partial expression in the state. That 
is, the members of mutually recognizing denomi-
nations can form a people “under God”, with the 
sense of acting according to the demands of God 
informing and maintaining their state, as in the 
case of the American “civil religion” alluded to 
above. Indeed, insofar as the divine Design in-
cludes freedom, this can be interpreted as calling 
for an openness to a plurality of denominations. 
This sense of a providential political mission has 
been very strong among American Protestants, 
and remains alive till this day (454). 
Notice that in getting close to recognizing the 
trans-denominational nation under God with its 
“providential political mission,” Taylor lays em-
phasis on the design argument and the constitu-
tional protection of religious freedom for a diversi-
ty of denominations. He then associates the mean-
ing of the nation “acting according to the demands 
of God” with “the state.” From the beginning, 
however, Americans were leery of the state and 
particularly of a strong central government. They 
wanted to hold their state governments account-
able to the people and to hold the federal govern-
ment accountable to the states and the people. The 
American civil religion was (is) not mediated by or 
through the state but through the free people as a 
nation whose originating covenant with God gives 
it its identity and mission in the world. 
The American civil religion, I am contending, 
has functioned as the nationally unifying public 
faith of a people who also, by their political con-
stitution, assure themselves of freedom to practice 
their denominational faiths privately. At one level 
of consciousness this view represents a sacred-sec-
ular distinction between, on one side, the sacred 
life of the churches, oriented toward the transcen-
dent, and, on the other side, the self-governing re-
public busy with its “secular” affairs. But it is the 
religiously grounded nation that undergirds the 
whole, making room for private modes of wor-
ship as well as the work of a constituted govern-
ment that is to serve the people and the nation. 
Sacredness, therefore, is not confined to the life of 
churches and religious denominational freedom. 
Taylor’s assessment of 
America’s civil religion, 
it seems to me, depends 
too much on this design 
argument and too little 
on what lies more deeply 
beneath it, namely, the new-
Israel myth....
8     Pro Rege—March 2015
Religious sacredness characterizes the nation in its 
core identity through the myth of its public origin, 
mission, and destiny in covenant with America’s 
god. This is a new, nationalistic religion that bor-
rows a few elements from the Bible and Christian 
tradition but is not a traditional religion in any 
Christian or Jewish sense.
Christians, it seems to me, should be able to 
recognize that America’s god is not the biblical 
God, and that the American civil-religious way 
of life is not fully compatible with a biblically di-
rected way of life. From a Christian point of view, 
America’s idea of itself as a new Israel comes from a 
secularized, nationalized misappropriation of parts 
of the biblical story. Christians and Jews should 
recognize the blasphemy of a modern nation iden-
tifying itself as the new Israel, while at the same 
time they can appreciate many of the country’s 
constitutional features, such as the rule of law, lim-
ited government, and more. 
Taylor again comes close to recognizing the re-
ligious character of the nation’s self-understanding 
when he says that, on the one hand, “a denomi-
national identity tends to separate religion from 
the state. A denomination cannot be a national 
church, and its members can’t accept and join 
whatever claims to be the national church,” but, 
on the other hand, “the political entity can be 
identified with the broader, over-arching ‘church’, 
and this can be a crucial element in its patriotism” 
(454). However, what Taylor refers to as the over-
arching “church” is not a national church at all, 
as he recognizes. The national bond, which Taylor 
senses is religious in a significant sense, is the com-
mon public allegiance to America’s god, who has 
chosen their nation to be a light to all nations. 
What makes this look like an “over-arching” na-
tional church is precisely the religious character of 
the myth of the nation as a publicly covenanted 
community under its god. The nation was, in that 
sense, constructed as a religio-political commu-
nity. 
This means that if we are to talk about reli-
gion and the moral/spiritual shape of human 
experience, it is necessary to talk about modern 
nationalism, communism, and a number of other 
organized movements that may have arisen from 
within the immanent frame of reference but which 
function as displacement religions. Their aim is to 
displace Christianity, for example, from its place 
as the publicly recognized and supported religion 
of a state or empire. But these movements are not 
thereby un-religious or non-religious. Rather, they 
function as displacement faiths, as what August 
Comte called the religion of humanity, or what 
John Dewey called the religion of democracy, or 
what we know of in America as the American civil 
religion. And the gods these secularized religions 
create are, from a Christian point of view, false 
gods—idols.
A few days before the Fourth of July, 2011, 
The Washington Post published an op-ed piece by 
Leon Kass5 in which he expressed worries about 
America’s increasing “thoughtlessness” about the 
meaning of Independence Day. He offered as an 
antidote some quotations from President Calvin 
Coolidge’s address on the 150th anniversary of the 
Declaration of Independence in 1926. That dec-
laration, said Coolidge, “‘represented the move-
ment of a people…a great mass of independent, 
liberty-loving, God-fearing people who knew their 
rights, and possessed the courage to dare to main-
tain them.’” What was the source of the ideas held 
sacred by Americans? It was, says Coolidge, their 
faith in “’the fatherhood of God and the broth-
erhood of man. They justified freedom by the 
text that we are all created in the divine image, 
all partakers of the divine spirit.’” And, “‘Unless 
the faith of the American people in these religious 
convictions is to endure, the principles of our 
Declaration will perish.’” Did Coolidge’s faith in 
America’s god border on intolerance? Not at all, 
says Kass, because America’s civil religion includes 
support for religious freedom. Coolidge “was no 
religious fanatic. He appreciated our constitu-
tional strictures against religious establishment 
and religious tests for office, limitations crucial 
to religious freedom and toleration, also prin-
ciples unique to the American founding. But he 
understood that free institutions and economic 
prosperity rest on cultural grounds, which in turn 
rest on religious foundations.” America, that is, is 
a religiously grounded nation, which supports de-
nominational religious freedom, as Coolidge and 
Kass have summed it up. Two uses of the word 
“religion” must be distinguished: the nonsectarian 
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national religion, on the one hand, which supports 
freedom for the practice of private denominational 
religions, on the other.
At one point, Taylor says that until the 1960s 
the American way of life was supported by three 
sides of a triangle: “the family was the matrix in 
which the young were brought up to be good citi-
zens and believing worshippers; religion was the 
source of the values that animated both family 
and society; and the state was the realization and 
bulwark of the values central to both family and 
churches. And this was all the more starkly under-
lined by the fact that American freedom needed 
to defend itself against ‘Godless Communism’” 
(506). First, notice Taylor’s identification of reli-
gion with one side of the triangle, the side that 
generates values for family and society. The state, 
too, is only one side of the triangle. But what is the 
identity of the triangular unit as a whole? Is it not 
the American nation? Taylor does not identify the 
triangular unit as religious, however, even though 
he points out that America’s role in the Cold War 
was to defend itself and the world against godless 
communism. As the words suggest, that defense 
amounted to much more than a military campaign 
against Soviet military aggression. It was under-
stood as a religiously deep national crusade against 
a religiously antagonistic enemy. It was a mission 
by the god-chosen nation to save the world from 
destruction by an anti-godly communist nation 
seeking world domination. 
Civilizational States
Peter J. Katzenstein sheds light on this drama in 
his discussion of the complex and multifaceted 
nature of “civilizational states” such as the United 
States, Japan, Russia, and China in particular.6 
The civilizations from which such states arise and 
which they carry forward in ongoing development 
have deep religious roots that are often ignored by 
modern scholars. The fact is that “different reli-
gious traditions act as cultural sources for the en-
actment of different programs of modernity.” And 
today through its war on terrorism, Katzenstein 
continues, “America’s religiously rooted sense 
of nationalism has become a defining element. 
Varieties of secularisms and religions remain a vital 
force in world politics and the foreign policies of 
the civilizational state we call America.”
Modern civil religions, America’s included, 
function as part of historically extended civiliza-
tional dramas that often include violent as well as 
nonviolent conflict. Taylor’s account of the emer-
gence of the secular age is largely limited to descrip-
tions of what now exists that has reset the “condi-
tions of belief ” as he interprets them. Traditional 
religious institutions and cultic practices largely 
accommodated themselves to those changes over 
time. But Taylor’s descriptive categorizing does not 
quite capture the contentious drama of civiliza-
tional forces in the way that Katzenstein describes 
them. Just as there were violent struggles among 
Roman Catholic, Protestant, and secular mod-
ernist movements from the sixteenth through the 
eighteenth centuries in Europe, and just as there 
have been all-or-nothing battles between Western 
nations and empires driven by competing ideolo-
gies and ambitions in the nineteenth through the 
twentieth centuries, so there continue to be reli-
giously deep struggles among nationalist, fascist, 
communist, and other secular-humanist move-
ments seeking to establish dominance in societies 
where people of traditional faiths may be seeking 
to gain or recover positions of social and political 
influence or control. Such conflicts are especially 
evident today on many fronts in many parts of the 
world and not only in the West.
The American effort to organize a coherent so-
cial and political order, says Taylor, was made pos-
sible because the diverse private faiths of citizens 
had a “consensual relation to the common civil 
religion. Go to the church of your choice, but go. 
Christians, it seems to me, 
should be able to recognize 
that America’s god is not the 
biblical God, and that the 
American civil-religious way 
of life is not fully compatible 
with a biblically directed way 
of life.
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Later this expands to include synagogues. When 
imams also begin to appear at prayer breakfasts, 
along with priests, pastors, and rabbis, the signal 
is that Islam is being invited into the consen-
sus. That means that one can be integrated as an 
American through one’s faith or religious identity” 
(534). These comments capture only one side of 
the process at work in the United States through 
much of its history. Insofar as Christians and even-
tually Jews and Muslims have found encourage-
ment from their respective faith communities to 
take part in the American way of life, their dif-
ferent faiths have indeed given positive encour-
agement for civic integration. But what is the at-
tracting force from the public side? What is it that 
citizens of diverse faiths become integrated into? 
What draws or drives them into it? Taylor refers to 
that public draw as simply America—becoming an 
American. But this draw—becoming American—
does not bring to light the civil-religious bond of 
the nation that supports the so-called “sectarian” 
religious bonds of the denominational faiths. 
One way to show how the American civil re-
ligion has made its demands of diverse religious 
groups (now typically referred to as sectarian) is 
to look at the school wars of the nineteenth cen-
tury. From its founding until about World War 
II, the American experiment depended more on a 
Protestant-deist moral consensus at the heart of its 
civil religion than on the durability of its political 
institutions, which, of course, did not manage to 
stave off the Civil War. The gradual disestablish-
ment of churches in the new States of the union 
depended on the religio-cultural consensus created 
by White Anglo-Saxon Protestantism (WASP). 
That is why it took some time before Jews and oth-
ers were accepted as full Americans and allowed 
to hold office. For African Americans it took even 
longer to be included. Catholics represented a par-
ticular threat from the 1830s on into the twentieth 
century because large-scale Catholic immigration 
challenged the WASP public-moral consensus. 
The biggest battles arose over schooling. 
When Catholics (and some Baptists) in New 
York City in the 1840s asked for the type of pub-
lic subsidy for their schools that was extended to 
WASP schools, the New York Free School Society, 
with encouragement from the New York City 
Common Council, changed its name to the New 
York Public School Society. That organization 
then decided that public funds should henceforth 
be distributed only to “nonsectarian” schools and 
not to what the society labeled “sectarian” schools. 
This decision had nothing to do with trying to 
establish a Protestant church or to enforce a uni-
form confession of ecclesiastical faith on the entire 
population. What the New York Public School 
Society did was to monopolize public funding for 
the “common schools” that represented and taught 
the WASP way of life as the American way of life. 
These were the schools that eventually came to be 
called public schools. All children were welcome to 
attend them without charge (for they were tax sup-
ported), but in them children would read the King 
James Bible, hear Protestant (or deist) prayers, 
and receive an education that would guide them 
onto the right path of the American way of life. If 
parents wanted their children to attend Catholic 
schools, they were free to organize them at their 
own expense, for such schools were considered 
sectarian and not representative of America’s non-
sectarian public ethos.
If one thinks of religion in a narrow sense as a 
matter of ecclesiastical institutions, liturgies, and 
personal beliefs, then Catholics did not experi-
ence religious discrimination in New York and 
Massachusetts and beyond. However, if one recog-
nizes the broader meaning of religions as ways of 
life, some of which can integrate the public life of 
a community and even of a nation or civilization, 
then the American way of life in the nineteenth 
century was certainly religious in a WASPish way. 
The cultivating of national values was not en-
trusted to families and churches alone. Catholic 
schools would not be granted public funding and 
equal public-legal recognition because they used 
the wrong version of the Bible and acknowledged 
as their highest earthly authority an ecclesiasti-
cal official (the pope) who was not subject to the 
American constitution and the mores of America’s 
civic faith. Making no public-legal room for self-
funded sectarian schools sealed the distinction be-
tween the public character of the American way 
of life and the private character of denominational 
religions. This nonsectarian/sectarian framework 
remains in place today, largely defining the terms 
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of countless debates and court cases involving 
schooling, welfare services, health-care delivery, 
and more.
Taylor’s book may be lauded in different ways, 
but in my estimation his description and mapping 
of what makes this a secular age works with too 
narrow a view of religion and the conditions of 
belief that characterize the age. A Secular Age does 
not take us far enough into a critical account of 
the public, religiously deep civilizational dynamics 
that have been uniting and dividing, integrating 
and disintegrating societies, including modern so-
cieties, for a very long time. 
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